China
has rapidly diminishing supplies of irrigable water and arable land as well as
an ever increasing population size who are demanding (and will demand) more
access to meat and exotic fruits. As a result, China is not self-sufficient in
food production and is seeking solutions to increasing its food security
outside of its borders. My last post investigated the extent to which China is seeking
solutions to its food security issues by investing in the agricultural sector
of Africa.
It
concluded that, contrary to popular belief, the Chinese government does not
have a coordinated programme aimed specifically at acquiring African
agricultural land to grow food for export. In fact, the majority of Chinese
investment is focused upon capacity building to foster a more productive and
efficient African agricultural sector. Additionally, and in contrast to popular
opinion, China relies very little upon Africa for supplies of agricultural
commodites. Whilst in fact, many African countries rely upon Chinese imports
for cereals and grains (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Be it China or Eritrea, the idea of
importing foodstuffs due to a lack of domestic self-sufficiency leads me to think about the concept of virtual
water. This post will explore the concept of virtual water and examine why it
is important to both African nations and the global community alike.
Virtual
water is defined as the volume of water needed to produce an agricultural commodity,
measured at the place where the product was produced (Allan, 2003).
Consequently, that volume of water becomes ‘embedded’ in the product it
produced and the water is effectively traded alongside it. In order to fully
understand the importance of virtual water trade it also crucial to understand
the concept of water footprints. Hoekstra and Mekonnen define the national
water footprint as a countries consumptive use of green water (soil water), blue water (river, lake) and grey water
(wastewater). This includes general consumption of water within the territory,
water used within the territory to produce export products and water used in
other countries to produce imported products (Hoekstra
and Mekonnen, 2012).
Therefore, the greater a countries water
footprint, the greater their consumption of water. For countries that have a
large water footprint and are water scarce, many have externalised their water
footprint via virtual water. This reduces the use of state water resources in
turn preventing water crises or deficits within their territory (Hoekstra and
Mekonnen, 2012). For example, 1000 litres of water are required to produce 1kg
of wheat. The capacity to import this wheat avoids the economic and political
stresses associated with accessing 1000 litres of water, in turn avoiding a potential water deficit and
associated difficulties (Allan, 2003).
Source: http://virtualwater.eu/ |
Thus, virtual water allows for international trade of water from
‘water-rich’ to ‘water-poor’ countries. However, it also means that countries
which have largely externalised their water footprint are highly dependent not
only on imports of food but also the freshwater resources of other countries (Hoekstra
and Mekonnen, 2012). Countries that have a large external water (and food)
dependency include: Malta (92%
dependency), Kuwait (90%), Israel (82%) (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). This dependency creates
new forms of political and economic interactions and relations between
countries. In addition, the relatively large volume of international virtual
water flows and associated external water dependencies strengthens the argument
that issues surrounding water scarcity must no longer be considered a domestic
problem but a global one (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012).
When virtual water trade is quantified and
spatially analysed it becomes apparent that the commodity flows from
‘water-rich’ to ‘water-poor’ countries. However, not all countries with a large
external water footprint (and therefore rely heavily on virtual water imports) are
water scarce. To highlight this Hoekstra and Mekonnen use the example of many
Northern European countries e.g. the UK. The UK has an external water footprint
of 60-95% thus it depends highly upon external freshwater resources. However,
this is not by necessity because the UK has a temperate climate, fertile soils
and ample capacity to expand agricultural production and therefore reduce their
external water dependency (Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012). Thus, in reality,
virtual water often flows from ‘cash-poor’ to ‘cash-rich countries’.
According
to Hoekstra and Mekonnen, countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Niger and Mali have
external water dependencies of less than 4%. Given that the UK has more than
sufficient water supplies but an external dependency of 60-95% it seems a
paradox that many of Africa’s most water-stressed countries have some of the
smallest external water footprints. This can be seen in figure 2 where the
whole of Sub Saharan Africa has a net negative virtual water balance i.e. their
exports of virtual water are greater than their imports of virtual water (Hoekstra
and Mekonnen, 2012).
Source: Hoekstra and Mekonnen, 2012 |
Allan, J. (2003). Virtual Water - the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus. Useful Concept or Misleading Metaphor?. Water International, 28(1), pp.106-113.
Hoekstra, A. and Mekonnen, M. (2012). The Water Footprint of Humanity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(9), pp.3232-3237.