Will Africa Feed China?

My previous post touched on foreign investment and involvement in the development of Africa’s agricultural sector. In that post it was the case of the significant investments being made by China and the European Union’s to increase Africa’s water storage capacity. With colonialism being an intrinsic part of Africa’s history I wondered whether China’s investment and involvement in Africa is merely a contemporary neo-colonialism, replicating previous patterns of extraction and exploitation, or whether in fact it represents a new paradigm of development (Scoones et. al., 2016). The topic of Chinese land-buying in Africa as a means of achieving Chinese food security has received particular attention in Western media. In this post I will explore to what extent China is investing in Africa’s agricultural industry and whether or not Africa will feed China.

In the first two decades of the 21^st century China (along with Brazil, Russia and India) emerged as a global investor and trader, particularly in agricultural investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). China’s rapidly growing economy and even faster growing middle-class means that demand for meat and exotic foods will only increase, necessitating more imports. As well, China houses 22% of the world’s population but has only 7% of the world’s arable land. The country has diminishing irrigable water and arable land supplies due to urban expansion, deforestation and desertification; it is estimated that between 1996 and 2006 China lost almost 9 million hectares of farmland (Horta, 2014), (Cheru and Modi, 2013), (Cassell, 2013).

Given China’s inevitable future increases in demand for food, decreasing agricultural capacity and the huge agricultural potential of Africa it doesn’t seem unreasonable to assume that China may look to Africa to secure large areas of arable land to ensure their own food security. This context combined with Chinas emergence as a global investor captured the attention of Western media and lead to a wealth of publications portraying China in neo-colonial pursuit of large areas of agricultural land to ensure their own food security. This image of China became cemented in the public’s mind (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

However, Deborah Bräutigam argues that the perception of China’s ambitions for China are a result of poor journalism, Western narratives of African victimisation and the Chinese themselves for exaggerating their ambitions for Africa (Olander and van Staden, 2016). She has also extensively demonstrated that there is a lack of evidence to support the public perception that China is on a mission of “large-scale land acquisition” in Africa nor are there any known Chinese land acquistions in Africa that exceed 50,000 hectares (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Indeed, the Chinese government is attempting to encourage Chinese agri-business companies to invest in African agriculture (Cassell, 2013). However, these incentives are often part of larger programmes promoting investment across a number of sectors. But, importantly, and contrary to what has been publicised in Western media, China does not have a coordinated strategy or programme specifically aimed at obtaining land in Africa to grow food for export (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). Therefore, acquisition of African land by some Chinese agribusiness companies merely reflects China’s ‘going global’ attitude toward trade and foreign investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

As well, China’s Ministry of Commerce maintains a database of Chinese companies’ approved overseas investment proposals for Africa. Of the 2372 approved proposals only 86 were explicitly intended for farming (i.e. production of grains, cash crops or animal husbandry). Therefore, the amount of Chinese companies that are interested in investing in African agriculture is small compared to the interest in investing in other sectors of Africa (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). In addition, not all approved proposals come to fruition and the investments that are being made are relatively small and certainly smaller than is reported by the media.

It seems strange that despite great interest there has not been any considerable investment in the African agricultural sector. Bräutigam claims that poor infrastructure and government inefficiency (and corruption in some cases) which exists in most land-rich African countries is to blame. When comparing Africa’s infrastructure and government inefficiency to that of Southeast Asia’s, where traditionally Chinese agricultural investment is targeted, Chinese businesses perceive the situation to be significantly worse in Africa thus deterring investment (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013).

Despite the low level of Chinese business investment in African agriculture, China has been involved in agriculture on the continent since the 1960’s. This is largely because China’s foreign aid programmes in Africa have always placed emphasis on agriculture (Bräutigam and Zhang, 2013). China’s engagement in Africa’s agricultural sector has focused on capacity building through agricultural technology transfer, training and establishment of agricultural demonstration farms (Cassell, 2013). By 2009, 200 demonstration farms, 11 agricultural research stations and 60 agricultural investment projects had been established (Cassell, 2013).

Nanga-Eboko Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre, Cameroon
Source: http://china.aiddata.org/projects/31719

Cassell actually claims that China’s engagement with Africa has done more to support African agricultural development and alleviate poverty than any previous attempts by western actors (Cassell, 2013). Scoones et. al. compare the Chinese and western approaches to involvement in African agriculture. He claims that Western donors primarily focus upon large scale business investment i.e. only one intervention type. In contrast, Chinese interventions are based on experimentation, adaptation, revision and continuous learning. As well, as being far more numerous and diverse. Chinese engagement is therefore long-term and starkly contrasting with Western run short-term projects and with stringent monitoring and evaluation (Scoones et. al, 2016).

Female farmers at Nanga-Eboko centre receiving training on how to use weeders on their farms.
Source: http://climatereporters.com

China’s manner of engagement with the African agricultural sector suggests the possibly of a new paradigm of development cooperation i.e. South-South has been established (Scoones et. al, 2016). Despite claims by China that its investment in Africa’s agricultural sector are for the interests of global food security only time will tell if this is a form of Chinese neo-colonialism or whether it is a genuine attempt to facilitate development in Africa.

Nevertheless, for the mean time, China claims it is not attempting to support African agriculture in order to export food back to China (Cassell, 2013). However, this isn’t to say Africa isn’t China’s long-term plan. If long-term Chinese investments continue African agriculture could permanently transform. Investment has the potential to reduce poverty and hunger in Africa whilst also helping achieve global food security. Whilst China is willing Africa needs to seize this opportunity because it could result in Africa feeding the future China (and the world)….

Bräutigam, D. and Zhang, H. (2013). Green Dreams: Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural Investment in Africa. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), pp.1676-1696.

Cheru, F. and Modi, R. (2013). Agricultural Development and Food Security in Africa. 1st ed. London: Zed Books, pp.173-189.

Horta, L. (2014). Chinese Agriculture Goes Global. Yaleglobal.yale.edu. Available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinese-agriculture-goes-global

Olander, E. and van Staden, C. (2016). Why the Chinese Are Not on a Land-Buying Spree in Africa. The Huffington Post. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-olander/chinese-land-africa_b_10056780.html].

Scoones, I., Amanor, K., Favareto, A. and Qi, G. (2016). A New Politics of Development Cooperation? Chinese and Brazilian Engagements in African Agriculture. World Development, 81, pp.1-12.